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VISUALLY PERCEIVING THE INTENTIONS OF OTHERS
By Grace Helton
I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as
blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming
to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel
movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal
intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further argue that these attributions are unrevisable in
a certain sense and that this result can be used to as part of an argument that these attributions are
not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and
more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the
mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally.
Keywords: visual perception, high-level perception, social cognition, dual-systems
theory, action, intention.
In a ground-breaking 1944 study, the psychologists Fritz Heider andMarianne
Simmel presented subjects with a short film depicting a small triangle, a large
triangle, and a circle moving about a stationary, partially filled-in square (see
Figure 1).When asked to describe the events in the film,most subjects produced
narrativeswhich ascribed intentions and desires to the two-dimensional shapes.
For instance, in one scene of the film, the large triangle moves to the right of
the screen, a short distance behind the small triangle and circle, which also
move to the right. Subjects described this scene as one in which the large
triangle chases the other shapes and one in which the smaller shapes flee from
the triangle (Heider and Simmel 1944). Though subjects might have described
this and other scenes in purely geometric terms, their descriptions consistently
treated the two-dimensional figures as agents performing actions.
It is difficult for subjects to interpret the movie in terms that do not involve
actions and aims. Even when subjects are instructed to provide a narrative in
terms of purely physical, geometric terms, they struggle to do so (Hashimoto
1966). Viewing the movie for oneself makes it clear why this is so. The figures
just seem to be fleeing, hiding, chasing, and even fighting; this reading is effortless
and immediate.
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Figure 1. Screenshot from the Heider & Simmel movie.
These results suggest that the typical subject viewing theHeider and Simmel
movie experiences the two-dimensional shapes as fleeing, hiding, and chasing,
in some sense of ‘experiences’. The question remains what kind of experience
this is. What kind of mental attitude or attitudes make up this experience? To
keep things concrete, I will focus on the representation of the smaller shapes
fleeing the large triangle, which I will refer to as the ‘fleeing’ mental state. On one
view, the subject in this state visually perceives the smaller shapes as fleeing the
triangle (Carruthers 2015; Gallagher 2008; Scholl and Gao 2013; Scholl and
Tremoulet 2000). On another view, the subject in this state merely perceives
shape, colour, and movement features, and the perception of these features
quickly and automatically generates a post-perceptual thought that the smaller
shapes are fleeing the triangle (Butterfill 2009: 408–9).1 These views don’t
exhaust possible explanations of the ‘fleeing’ state, but I take them to be more
plausible than other explanations (I defend this presumption in Sections I and
V.2).
I will argue that the typical subject viewing the Heider and Simmel movie
visually perceives the smaller shapes as fleeing the triangle. Moreover, in visu-
ally perceiving the smaller shapes as fleeing the triangle, this subject perceives
the smaller shapes as acting on a certain proximal intention, the intention of
evading the large triangle. Thus, just as we can visually perceive something
as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we visually perceive the intentions
of others. In the case of the Heider and Simmel movie, the visual experience
1 Prinz (2005, 2007) rejects the view that we perceive features beyond ‘intermediate-level’
features such as shape, colour, and motion. Spaulding (2015) permits that we might perceive
motor intentions but denies that we perceive other kinds of intentions. Shea (2014: 85–6), following
Carey (2009), places the representation of animacy in a borderline case, of a kind that is neither
determinately cognitive nor determinately perceptual.
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as of the intentions of others is a visual illusion, on a par with more familiar
illusions such as the Mu¨ller-Lyer Illusion.
Though I will ultimately reject the cognitive explanation of the ‘fleeing’ mental
state, on which this state is a thought, one of the aims of this paper is to show
that the cognitive explanation is much more resilient than its opponents have
supposed. In particular, a version of the cognitive explanation which appeals
to automatically and quickly generated thoughts—what are sometimes called
System 1 thoughts—can accommodate the phenomenology of the ‘fleeing’ state.
The argument I offer in favour of the view that we can visually perceive
others’ intentions is rooted in the claim that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is, in
a certain sense, unrevisable. This is the claim that the subject who tokens the
‘fleeing’ state is psychologically incapable of rationally revising that state in
response to at least some kinds of conflicting evidence. (In Section IV, I clarify
this claim and distinguish it from the stronger claim that the ‘fleeing’ state is
cognitively impenetrable.) Drawing on empirical evidence, I mount an inductive
argument that the view that the ‘fleeing’ state is a thought cannot accommodate
the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable. This is because thoughts have a
capacity to be rationally revised in response to conflicting evidence, though this
capacity is often not realized. (Not all thoughts have this capacity; delusions
lack it. In Section V.3, I offer different grounds for thinking that the ‘fleeing’
state is not a delusion.) In contrast, the view that the ‘fleeing’ state is a visual
experience can satisfyingly explain this state’s unrevisability.
The strategy I employ to argue that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is a visual ex-
perience reflects a deeper suggestion about what, in general, might distinguish
perceptual states from the thoughts they elicit. The suggestion is that at least
some perceptual states are not rationally revisable in response to counterevi-
dence, whereas thoughts are rationally revisable in response to such evidence.
Here is the plan for the paper. In Section I, I clarify the thesis and suggest
some reasons it matters. In Section II, I argue that the visual explanation
of the ‘fleeing’ mental state is initially plausible. In Section III, I argue that
a certain construal of the cognitive explanation is also initially plausible. In
Section IV, I adduce empirical evidence in favour of the view that the ‘fleeing’
state is unrevisable. In Section V, I argue that the cognitive explanation of
the ‘fleeing’ state cannot account for the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state is un-
revisable. In Section VI, I show how the visual explanation can satisfyingly
explain the unrevisability of the ‘fleeing’ state, and I conclude in favour of this
explanation.
I. THE THESIS AND WHY IT MATTERS
The thesis of this paper is that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of
others. In the relevant sense, visual perception is the kind of environmentally
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triggered experience whose paradigm instances include seeing something as
blue and seeing something as spherical. If the present thesis is true, then there
is a kind of parity between the paradigm instances of visual perception and
the visual perception of the intentions of others: if and insofar as a completed
cognitive science must account for the visual experience of (say) colour, so too
must a completed cognitive science account for the visual experience of the
intentions of others.
Relatedly, the thesis that we visually perceive the intentions of others will
not turn out to be true if we merely see others’ intentions in an extended sense
of ‘see’, e.g. in the sense of ‘see’ in which one might read pre-election polls and
see who the election’s victor will be.
Notice that the claim that we visually perceive others’ intentions is neutral
on the question of whether the relevant visual experiences are themselves
partly constituted by cognitive elements.2 The paper’s thesis is that others’
intentions are sometimes represented by visual experiences, not merely by
post-perceptual thoughts.
The claim that we visually perceive the intentions of others is the claim
that we sometimes enjoy visual experiences as of the intentions of others.
These experiences are not necessarily accurate. Just as one might inaccurately
perceive a red object as blue or a two-dimensional object as three-dimensional,
so too might one inaccurately perceive some entity which lacks a certain
intention as possessing that intention. Relatedly, the locution ‘perception as
of ’ is conventionally non-committal as to whether the relevant perceptual
state is accurate, and the locution ‘perception of ’ is conventionally reserved
for accurate perception. I generally adhere to this convention but occasionally
abandon it for the sake of naturalness. Throughout, all talk of perception
should be understood to be talk of ‘as of ’ perception.
The present thesis is the claim that our visual experiences sometimes ascribe
to others the feature of in fact possessing a certain intention. This thesis will
not turn out to be true if visual experiences only ever ascribe to others the
perceiver-dependent feature of seeming to possess a certain intention. Relatedly,
I am presuming a substantive, if widely held, view about perceptual content:
that perception sometimes ascribes perceiver-independent features to objects,
such as being spherical or being grooved. This view contrasts with the view that
perception only ever ascribes perceiver-dependent features to objects, such as
seeming spherical or seeming grooved (Glu¨er 2009; Cf. Brogaard 2014).
The thesis should further be clarified as the claim that typical humans some-
times perceive the intentions of others. If humans have this capacity, they have
it contingently. Such humans might have been otherwise, as demonstrated by
the fact that many humans are otherwise. For instance, subjects who are autistic
2 For defences of this view, see: Byrne (2009), Carruthers (2015), Glu¨er (2009), and Quilty-
Dunn (2015).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/68/271/243/4693826
by Princeton University user
on 04 May 2018
SEEING OTHERS’ INTENTIONS 247
or who have legions of the amygdala do not visually perceive the intentions of
others (Congiu, Schlottmann and Ray 2010; Heberlein and Adolphs 2004).
The argument I will make in favour of the thesis draws on cases of inaccurate
representation and thus, can at most establish that there are visual illusions
as of the intentions of others. One might reasonably wonder whether we ever
accurately visually perceive others’ intentions. I am presuming that if we ever
inaccurately perceive others’ intentions, then it is overwhelmingly likely that
we also sometimes accurately perceive others’ intentions. For it would be very
surprising if the inaccurate representation as of the smaller shapes fleeing the
triangle were a visual experience, but the accurate representation as of (say) a
cat fleeing an overly friendly toddler were not a visual experience. Given the
subjective and functional similarities of these representations, we can safely
assume that they belong to the same mental kind.
Finally, the present thesis is restricted to the claim that we can visually
perceive proximal intentions that are bound up with paradigm prey/predator
activities, such as fleeing, chasing, fighting, seeking, and hiding. I take it to
be an open question whether other intentions are perceived. My reason for
focusing on these intentions is that their representations are cross-culturally
invariant and diachronically stable, and my argument exploits these features.
Likewise, the present thesis is neutral on the question of whether mental
states other than intentions—such as emotions and thoughts—are perceived.
It is feasible that the present argument might be suitably modified to establish
the perception of other mental states, but determining whether the argument
might be so extended would require an examination of several issues which
are beyond the scope of this paper.3
What is the import of the claim that we perceive intentions that are bound
up with prey/predator activities? One reason this claimmatters is that it might
explain how typical subjects form at least some of their beliefs about others’
mental states. The thesis would at least clear ground for a direct perceptual
view of acquiring beliefs about others, on which subjects at least sometimes
form beliefs about others’ mental states via perception, without any mediating
inference (see, e.g. Gallagher 2008).
Another reason it matters whether typical subjects perceive others’ inten-
tions is that this claim might illuminate certain disorders of theory of mind, such as
autism spectrum disorders, since these involve deficits in attributing intentions
(Congiu, Schlottmann and Ray 2010). Of course, such disorders do not merely
involve deficits in the attributions of prey/predator intentions. Nevertheless,
the result that non-autistic subjects perceive such intentions, whereas autistic
3 One such issue is whether emotions or other mental states partly constitute some of the
actions we perceive; for my argument relies on the claim that certain intentions partly constitute
some of the actions we perceive.
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subjects do not, raises the possibility that some of the other deficits associated
with autism are rooted in a more basic perceptual deficit.
Another reason it matters whether we can visually perceive others’ inten-
tions is that if we can, this would tell in favour of the disputed claim that we
can perceive at least some high-level features. High-level features are any features
other than low-level features, whose paradigmatic instances in the visual domain
include shape, colour, and motion. It has recently been proposed that we can
visually perceive a range of high-level features, including artefactual features
(e.g. being a guitar), absence features, event-causal features, natural kind features
(e.g. being a lemur), social features (e.g. being masculine), and moral features (Audi
2013; Bayne 2008, 2009; Block 2014; Butterfill 2009; Chappell 2008; Cullison
2010; Farennikova 2013, Fish 2012; Nanay 2011a; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000;
Siegel 2005, 2010; Sorensen 2012; cf. Prinz 2005, 2007; Rips 2011).4 My argu-
ment that we visually perceive the intentions of others might in principle be
used to show that we visually perceive other kinds of high-level features.
Before proceeding to the visual and cognitive explanations of the ‘fleeing’
state, it may be worth justifying why I focus on these views. Why, for instance,
do I not take seriously the view that the ‘fleeing’ state is a merely entertained
thought, of the sort the subject does not endorse?
Merely entertained thoughts typically cease to exist when certain of their
subject’s aims are fulfilled (Shah and Velleman 2005: 498). For instance, the
geometry student tasked with proving that no triangle has four sides might, for
the purpose of proving otherwise, entertain the thought that there exists some
triangle that has four sides. Once this student has derived a contradiction,
she will no longer retain this assumption, since it has served its purpose. In
contrast, the ‘fleeing’ mental state persists so long as the relevant stimulus is
present, whether or not this state has satisfied its subject’s aims. So, I take it to
be unlikely that the ‘fleeing’ state is a merely entertained thought.
II. THE INITIAL PLAUSIBILITY OF THE VISUAL
EXPLANATION
On the visual explanation of the ‘fleeing’ mental state, this state is a visual
experience. But what is it to see someone as fleeing? In this section, I argue
that the visual experience as of someone fleeing is, at least in part, a visual
experience as of someone acting on a proximal intention of evasion. There
are three steps in this argument: first, the activity of fleeing is partly made up
of a proximal intention of evasion. Second, the fact that fleeing constitutively
involves such an intention is an easily conceptually accessible fact. Third,
4 For a discussion of the relevance of high-level perception for epistemology and philosophy
of action, see Helton (2016: 853).
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a certain perceptual closure principle holds: if some feature  is at least partly
constituted by some feature and this relation is easily conceptually accessible,
then to perceive  is thereby to perceive .
II.1. The ‘fleeing’ mental state as attributing intention
It is essential to my argument that subjects who view the Heider and Simmel
movie represent the figures as performing actions, not merely as moving.
Actions necessarily involve agents and, at least very often, aims. Recall that
subjects describe the figures’ movements in richly agential terms, such as fleeing,
hiding, fighting, and chasing. Recall further that subjects struggle to describe these
movements in purely geometric terms, such as moving to the right or moving in
front of (Hashimoto 1966; Heider and Simmel 1944). The most straightforward
explanation of these results is that subjects represent the figures as performing
actions, such as fleeing and chasing, not merely as moving.
At least some actions, such as fleeing, are partly constituted by proximal
intentions. Before arguing for this claim, it may be useful to illustrate the
difference between proximal and distal intentions: my six-year-old nephew
sometimes catches my eye, grins maniacally, and then runs away from me. He
knows that when he does this, I’m likely to chase him, catch him, and tickle
him. In running away from me, my nephew acts on the distal intention of
getting caught, since his ultimate aim is to get me to catch him and tickle him.
But in fleeing, he acts on the proximal intention of evading me. My nephew’s
distal and proximal intentions thus come apart.5
The following example suggests that a proximal intention of evasion is
necessary for some act to count as fleeing: suppose you go on a jog in a
wooded area. Unbeknownst to you, a curious squirrel scampers after you.
Intuitively, you do not flee the squirrel, even though you do self-propel away
from the squirrel. Plausibly, the reason your self-propulsion away from the
squirrel does not count as an act of fleeing the squirrel is that you lack a
proximal intention to evade the squirrel. This suggests that such an intention is
a necessary condition on fleeing.
The fact that fleeing is partly made up of a proximal intention of evasion
is a conceptually accessible fact; this fact can be accessed just by reflecting on
cases such as the ‘squirrel’ case, without empirical investigation. In this way,
this fact is unlike the fact that the sun is larger than the earth and unlike the
fact that water is composed of H20. Moreover, the fact that fleeing is made
up of a proximal intention of evasion is easily accessed by reflecting on relevant
cases. Discovering this fact does not require extensive or effortful deliberation,
nor does it require theoretically sophisticated background assumptions beyond
those demanded by ordinary reasoning.
5 This distinction roughly follows Mele (1992).
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Why does it matter that the relation between fleeing and an intention of
evasion is easily conceptually accessible? The relevance is that perceptual
content adheres, I submit, to the following perceptual closure principle:
If: S perceives ,  is at least partly constituted by some feature , and this relation is
easily conceptually accessible, then: in perceiving , S thereby perceives .
The reason to accept the perceptual closure principle is that it gives the
intuitively correct result in a wide range of cases. For instance, it permits us
to say that the subject who perceives some entity as square thereby perceives
that entity as a closed geometric figure; that the subject who perceives some
entity as azure thereby perceives that entity as blue; and that the subject who
perceives some entity as moving thereby perceives that entity as changing in
location.
At the same time, the perceptual closure principle does not force us to accept
certain less-than-intuitive results. For instance, it does not force us to say that
subjects perceive all features which are metaphysically entailed by those they
perceive. Suppose that as it turns out, every feature metaphysically entails the
feature not being a square circle. The closure principle does not predict that the
subject who perceives (say) redness thereby also perceives the feature not being a
square circle. This is because the feature not being a square circle does not constitute
the feature being red, and the closure principle pertains only to features which
at least partly constitute perceived features.
Likewise, the perceptual closure principle is neutral on the controversial
question of whether we perceive natural kinds. For instance, it is neutral on the
question of whether the subject who perceives a glass of water thereby perceives
H20 and onwhether the subjectwhoperceives a patch of light thereby perceives
electromagnetic radiation. Since neither the relation between water and H20
nor the relation between light and electromagnetic radiation is conceptually
accessible, the principle is silent on such cases.
Finally, the perceptual closure principle does not force us to say that we
can perceive arcane aspects of perceived features. For instance, there is a
lively philosophical literature on the metaphysics of holes. One controversy
is whether holes are immaterial (Casati and Varzi 2014). Suppose that as it
turns out, holes are immaterial. Suppose further that this fact is in principle
conceptually accessible. The perceptual closure principle would not force us
to say that the subject who perceives some entity as a hole thereby perceives
that entity as immaterial. The perceptual closure principle pertains only to
easily accessible facts, and the fact that holes are immaterial particulars is
presumably not easily accessible, as evidenced by the large and contentious
philosophical literature devoted to settling this fact.6
6 The question of whether we perceive holes’ arcane traits is from Siegel (2009).
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So far, I’ve suggested that fleeing is partly comprised of a proximal intention
of evasion and that this fact is easily conceptually accessible. By combining
these claims with the perceptual closure principle, we obtain the result that
to visually perceive some entity as fleeing is thereby to perceive that entity
as proximally intending to evade someone or something else. Going forward,
I will assume that this claim is true and will focus on defending the claim
that subjects viewing the Heider and Simmel figure visually perceive the figures
as fleeing, and do not merely judge, think, or otherwise non-perceptually
represent these figures as fleeing.
II.2. An initial defence of the visual explanation
Initial evidence for the view that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is a perceptual
experience comes from the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state is generated quickly,
effortlessly, and apparently non-inferentially. The view that the ‘fleeing’ state is
a visual experience—not an auditory or other sort of perceptual experience—is
supported by the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state is dependent on certain features
present in the subject’s low-level visual experience, such as directionality and
speed (Gao, Newman and Scholl 2009; Gao and Scholl 2011; Scholl and Gao
2013).
One worry about the visual explanation of the ‘fleeing’ mental state stems
from the fact that the nature of intentions is a fraught theoretical issue.
It is controversial, for instance, whether intentions are causally efficacious
in action and whether unforeseen consequences can count as intentional
(Setiya 2015).
There are two worries in this vicinity. The first is the methodological con-
cern that we will not be able to determine whether we see intentions prior
to settling on a theory of the nature of intentions. The second is the con-
cern that if intentions turn out to have a conceptually sophisticated nature,
then it is implausible that they are perceived, since our ordinary visual ex-
periences do not seem to attribute conceptually sophisticated features to the
world.
Both of these concerns can be addressed simultaneously: if we perceive
intentions at all, we perceive them without thereby perceiving arcane aspects
of their nature. In general, perception as of does not typically (if ever) involve
the perception as of the arcane features of . This point is cogently argued by
Susanna Siegel, who makes it by reflecting on the question, already discussed,
of what it is to perceive a hole:
Suppose you see some cheese with a hole in it . . . According to one theory of the
metaphysics of holes, they are immaterial particulars. According to an opposing theory,
they are material but negative parts of material particulars. When the cheese appears
to have a hole in it, does it appear to host an immaterial particular, or does it appear to
have a material part – or neither, or both? . . . The best answer seems to be ‘neither: ’
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visual experience just seems neutral on whether the hole in the cheese is a material but
negative part or an immaterial part hosted by a material particular. (Siegel 2009: 539)7
Just as we can perceive the hole in a slice of Swiss cheese without perceiving
it as (say) a negative part of a material particular, so too can we perceive
someone as proximally intending to evade someone or something else without
thereby perceiving that intention as (say) necessarily causally efficacious. Our
experience of others’ intentions is simply silent about some of themore obscure
metaphysical questions about intentions.Moreover, this result is consistent with
the previously defended claim that easily accessible aspects of intentions are
perceived.
III. THE INITIAL PLAUSIBILITY OF THE COGNITIVE
EXPLANATION
On the cognitive explanation, the ‘fleeing’ mental state involves visual per-
ception as of shape, colour, and movement features, combined with a post-
perceptual thought, ‘the smaller shapes are fleeing the triangle’. Visual expe-
rience itself does not represent the shapes as fleeing.
Because the ‘fleeing’ mental state is automatic, felt to be immediate, and
unmediated by conscious inference, it might seem implausible that the ‘fleeing’
state is a thought. Such features are typically associated with perceptual states,
not with thoughts. Indeed, some advocates of the view that we visually perceive
the intentions of others have taken the presence of these features to tell against
a cognitive explanation of experiences like the ‘fleeing’ state (Gallagher 2008:
536–8; Scholl and Gao 2013, Scholl and Tremoulet 2000: 299). In this section,
I show that a version of the cognitive explanation that appeals to System 1
thoughts can account for these aspects of the ‘fleeing’ state.
System 1 thoughts are formed automatically, quickly, and as the result of
non-conscious, heuristic processing. Though the product of non-conscious pro-
cessing, System 1 thoughts are often themselves conscious. System 1 thoughts
contrast with System 2 thoughts, which are formed deliberatively, slowly, and
as the result of explicit inference (Evans 2008). The following problem can be
used to help illustrate System 1 thoughts. Try to answer it as quickly as you
can:
If it takes 5machines 5minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100machines
to make 100 widgets?
If you are like most people, the answer 100 minutes probably popped into
your head (Thompson 2009). However, the correct answer to the question is
7 Nanay (2011b: 305–6) makes a similar point.
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5 minutes. The fact that most participants give an incorrect answer is somewhat
surprising, given that the correct answer can be arrived at using a bit of simple
algebra.8
By what process do subjects generate the incorrect answer? It appears that
subjects rely on a matching heuristic. Subjects notice the pattern 5:5:5 and the
partially completed pattern 100:100: , and they generate 100 minutes as the
correct answer (Thompson 2009).
Though subjects appear to be relying on a matching heuristic, it is very
unlikely that subjects are aware that they are doing this. That is, this answer
does not appear to be the result of conscious inference. Conscious inference is
time consuming, and the incorrect answer is produced very quickly. Moreover,
had subjects engaged in explicit inference, it is unlikely they would have
opted for a matching heuristic, since a moment’s consideration shows that the
problem is not a matching task. Thus, on the best explanation, the attractive
but incorrect response is the conscious output of a process which is itself non-
conscious. Relatedly, the incorrect answer to the problem is not associated with
a feeling of effort. One simply ‘sees’ the answer. In these respects, the incorrect
response to the ‘widgets’ problem is a paradigm System 1 thought.
A version of the cognitive explanation which appeals to System 1 thoughts
can accommodate the phenomenology of the ‘fleeing’ state. According to such
an explanation, it is because the ‘fleeing’ thought is generated very quickly
after the onset of the visual perception of shape and colour that there is no
experienced temporal gap between the perception of these features and the
thought, ‘the smaller shapes are fleeing the triangle’. Further, the ‘fleeing’
thought is formed without conscious initiation or effort, which is why the
subject does not experience initiation or effort. Finally, because the ‘fleeing’
thought is the conscious output of a non-conscious process, subjects are not
consciously aware of forming an inference. In sum, the view that the ‘fleeing’
state is a System 1 thought can account for the fact that it just seems as though
the smaller shapes are fleeing the triangle.
IV. THE UNREVISABILITY OF THE ‘FLEEING’ MENTAL STATE
In this section, I argue that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is, in a certain sense,
unrevisable. I will ultimately argue that the cognitive explanation cannot
accommodate this fact, whereas the visual explanation can. The ‘fleeing’ state
is unrevisable in the following sense:
8 Since 5 machines work at a rate of 1 widget per minute, 100 machines work at a rate of 20
widgets per minute. So, it will take 100 machines 5 minutes to complete 100 widgets. This task is
originally from the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick 2005).
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UNREVISABILITY (dfn.) Let m be a mental state which represents p and which is
tokened in some subject S. Then, m is unrevisable just in case there exists at least some
kind of evidence e such that m is not rationally revised in response to e, in all worlds in
which:
(i) S’s core psychological mechanisms are held fixed,
(ii) e is among S’s evidence, and
(iii) e is all-things-considered evidence that p is false.
Unrevisability is a kind of nomic incapacity and more particularly, a kind of
psychological incapacity. Thus, for some mental state to be unrevisable, it is
not necessary that it be unrevised in all metaphysically possible scenarios. It
need only be unrevised in all psychologically possible scenarios, and more
particularly, in all scenarios in which the relevant subject’s core psychological
mechanisms are held fixed.9
Some psychological mechanism is a core psychological mechanism for some
subject just in case that mechanism is counterfactually robust and governs the
revision of at least some of that subject’s attitudes. Different kinds of attitudes
are likely governed by different mechanisms of revision—e.g. emotions are
likely governed by different mechanisms than those which govern thoughts or
perceptual states. All of these are core mechanisms.
Even if we restrict our attention to typical adults, any attempted list of
core psychological mechanisms will be vast and inevitably incomplete. Never-
theless, we can illustrate the notion of a core mechanism by considering the
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, which plays an important role in attitude
regulation. Cognitive dissonance includes a mechanism which triggers a feel-
ing of discomfort in response to inconsistent attitudes and further mechanisms
which dispose subjects in a dissonant state to resolve their attitudes in the direc-
tion of greater mutual consistency (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007).
All of these mechanisms are, for typical adults, core mechanisms, since they
are counterfactually stable mechanisms which govern the revision of attitudes.
For a mental state to count as unrevisable, it must be incapable of rational
revision. For a mental state to be rationally revised in response to counterevi-
dence, that state must be reduced in strength or extinguished altogether; that
state must not increase in strength or remain unchanged in strength (See
9 One might wonder why I do not focus instead on the claim that the ‘fleeing’ state
can exist at the same time as a thought that conflicts with it. If thoughts seldom or never
conflict, this claim gives us some reason to think that the ‘fleeing’ state is not a thought.
There is a reason to suppose that thoughts can and often do conflict (Byrne 2009; Evans
2008; Gertler 2011; Helton 2015; Huddleston 2012; Mandelbaum 2014; Mylopoulos 2015;
Quilty-Dunn 2015). Superstitious views can conflict with one’s better judgement (Huddleston
2012). Certain highly intuitive but incorrect responses to mathematical puzzles can persist even
after one learns those responses to be incorrect (Helton 2015: 90–1; Mylopoulos 2015: 768). So, I
take the claim that the ‘fleeing’ state can exist at the same time as a thought that conflicts with it
to be insufficient to establish that the ‘fleeing’ state is not itself a thought.
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footnote 9). Further, this state must be revised because of the evidence that
conflicts with it, not because of non-evidential factors, such as prudential fac-
tors. Finally, the revision must occur via a non-deviant route. Suppose you
should read in the paper that a generally favoured candidate is behind in exit
polls and the shock causes you to fall and hit your head. Should the blow
fortuitously cause you to lose your belief that the favoured candidate will win,
your belief is revised by relevant evidence, but the route to revision is deviant,
so the revision is not rational.
It is important to note that unrevisability is weaker than the familiar trait
of cognitive impenetrability. Some mental state is cognitively impenetrable only
if that mental state is rationally insusceptible to all sorts of counterevidence
(Macpherson 2012). In contrast, some mental state is unrevisable just in case
that mental state is rationally insusceptible to at least some sorts of counterev-
idence. Thus, every cognitively impenetrable mental state is unrevisable, but
not every unrevisable mental state is cognitively impenetrable.
The difference between cognitive impenetrabilitiy and unrevisability can
be illustrated as follows: suppose that some subject visually perceives a pineap-
ple’s shape. Suppose further that this subject’s experience of the pineapple’s
shape is not rationally responsive to any kind of counterevidence—whether
testimony, previously observed environmental patterns, conflicting informa-
tion from other sensory modalities, or anything else. In this case, the visual
perception of the pineapple’s shape is cognitively impenetrable. It is therefore
also unrevisable.
But now, suppose that the subject’s visual experience of the pineapple’s shape
is rationally responsive to some kinds of counterevidence, but not other kinds.
For instance, suppose the experience is rationally responsive to previously
observed patterns in the environment but not to reliable testimony. In this
case, the visual experience of the pineapple’s shape is unrevisable, because
there are some kinds of counterevidence which do not rationally influence it.
At the same time, this experience is not cognitively impenetrable, since there
are other kinds of counterevidence which do rationally influence it.
To show, then, that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable, we need only
establish that there are at least some kinds of counterevidence which have
no rational impact on that state. We needn’t additionally establish that the
‘fleeing’ state is rationally insusceptible to all forms of counterevidence, i.e.
that it is cognitively impenetrable.
IV.1. An argument for the ‘fleeing’ mental state’s unrevisability
In this section, I argue that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable. I will
ultimately draw on this result to argue that the ‘fleeing’ state is perceptual. I
do not claim that all perceptual experiences are unrevisable. But for those that
are, their unrevisability can be used as part of an argument to establish that
they are perceptual.
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Here is an inductive argument that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable.
Let S be a typical subject viewing the Heider and Simmel movie under normal
viewing conditions:
(1) S represents the smaller shapes as fleeing the triangle.
(2) S enjoys all-things-considered evidence that the smaller shapes are not
fleeing the triangle.
(3) S’s representation as of the smaller shapes fleeing the triangle does not
diminish in strength or disappear in response to the evidence that that
representation is inaccurate.
(4) S’s representation as of the smaller shapes fleeing the triangle is such
that it cannot be rationally revised in response to at least some kinds of
counter-evidence, i.e. the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable.
First to consider (1), which states that the typical subject viewing the Heider
and Simmel movie represents the smaller shapes as fleeing the triangle. The
reasons for accepting this claim have been previously enumerated: subjects
describe the movie in terms that ascribe intentions to the animated figures,
and this interpretation is irresistible. Introspection further supports the view
that in viewing the Heider and Simmel movie, it just seems as though the shapes
are fleeing, chasing, hiding, and so on.
Why accept (2), that the typical subject who tokens the ‘fleeing’ mental state
possesses all-things-considered evidence that this mental state is inaccurate?
Consider that the typical subject viewing the Heider and Simmel movie is
likely very familiar with the medium of two-dimensional animation. So, we
can safely suppose that this subject enjoys all-things-considered evidence that
the figures in the animation are not really acting on intentions. This subject
understands that these shapes are inanimate geometric shapes, incapable of
acting or intending.
One concern about (2) is that it seems possible that the typical subject might
selectively access her evidence that the figures are inanimate, flipping between
this evidence and the fantasy that the figures are alive. On this view, this subject
never accesses the relevant evidence at the same time that she tokens the ‘fleeing’
state. If this is right, then there is never a simultaneous conflict between the
subject’s accessed evidence and her representation.
Here is a reason to think that subjects at least sometimes access evidence
that the figures are not animate at the very same time that subjects represent
the figures as fleeing and engaging in other actions. Most subjects viewing the
movie for the first time find it surprising and, relatedly, amusing. This suggests
that subjects are aware that what they are experiencing is inaccurate even
while they are in the grip of the illusion. For if this were not the case, it would
be difficult to explain why the ‘fleeing’ representation should be surprising,
since surprise necessarily involves a violation of expectations. Subjects should
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find the movie no more surprising than seeing a blade of grass as green or
than feeling an unsanded bit of wood as rough.
A different objection to (2) stems from the fact that the creatures in the
Heider and Simmel movie inhabit a fictional world. Evaluated relative to the
context of the relevant fictional world, it is true that the smaller shapes flee the
triangle. Similarly, evaluated relative to the fictional world of Pride and Prejudice,
it is true that Miss Bennet wishes to marry Mr Darcy. If the representation as of
the smaller shapes fleeing the triangle is evaluated relative to the fictional world
which these shapes inhabit, then the typical subject should lack evidence that
this representation is inaccurate. For evaluated relative to the fictional context,
this representation is accurate.
As it turns out, the fact that the Heider and Simmel movie describes a
fictional world does not explain why it elicits an unrevisable representation of
others’ intentions. For there are contexts which don’t involve fiction in which
subjects represent others as acting and in which these representations appear
insusceptible to counterevidence.
For instance, in one study, subjects reported that certain robots seemed to
them to have a capacity to plan and a capacity to exercise self-control, even
though the robots in question did not appear human-like or biological in nature
(Gray andWegner 2012: 126–7). Since these robots were of a crude mechanical
design, subjects were almost certainly aware that these robots did not in fact
possess agency. Moreover, since these robots were three-dimensional entities,
it seems unlikely that the subjects regarded them as inhabiting a fictional
scenario.
Going forward, I will continue to talk in terms of the Heider and Simmel
movie, since this stimulus has been empirically investigated in respects that are
important to my argument. But I will help myself to the assumption that the
fact that the Heider and Simmel movie depicts a fictional world is inessential
to an explanation of why the movie gives rise to an unrevisable representation
as of others’ intentions.
Next, to defend (3), which states that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is neither
reduced in strength nor extinguished in response to all-things-considered evi-
dence that it is inaccurate. The support for (3) comes from a number of studies
of the Heider and Simmel movie and of relevantly similar ‘animacy’ stimuli,
which show that virtually all subjects represent the figures in these stimuli as
animate (Scholl and Gao 2013). Indeed, the only subjects who do not expe-
rience the ‘animacy’ interpretation are those who have an autism spectrum
disorder or lesions of the amygdala (Abell, Happe´ and Frith 2000; Heberlein
and Adolphs 2004; Klin 2000; Rutherford, Pennington and Rogers 2006). If
the typical subject’s ‘fleeing’ state were in some cases revised in response to
conflicting evidence, we would expect some subjects to report that the ‘fleeing’
state is diminished in strength or disappears after onset. But we do not find
this.
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The claim that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable is further supported
by the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state remains robust for subjects across multi-
ple viewings. For instance, many researchers working on the psychology of
animacy have seen the Heider and Simmel movie countless times. These re-
searchers continue to experience the smaller shapes as fleeing the triangle,
even after multiple viewings (Scholl and Gao 2013). So, permitting subjects
additional time to assimilate the counterevidence does not seem to impact the
‘fleeing’ state.
I have argued that the typical subject viewing the Heider and Simmel
movie has a counterfactually robust tendency to represent the smaller shapes
as fleeing the triangle and that this tendency is not responsive to evidence that
the shapes aren’t really fleeing the triangle. These claims together give us some
reason to think that the typical subject’s ‘fleeing’ mental state is not capable of
being rationally revised in response to at least some sorts of counterevidence,
i.e. that the ‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable.
IV.2. Objections to the unrevisability claim
Since the argument presented is inductive, it purports to show that (1)—(3)
together probabilify (4). The argument does not purport to show that (1)—(3)
together entail (4). Thus, one might grant that (1)—(3) are true but maintain
that there are other grounds for rejecting the conclusion that the ‘fleeing’
mental state is unrevisable. I will consider and reject two such grounds.
A first reason to doubt that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable comes
from the fact that tested subjects tend to be highly educated members of indus-
trially developed countries. These subjects are likely to have been extensively
exposed to cartoons and graphically rich video games. It is not unreasonable
to suppose that this exposure has trained such subjects to suspend reality when
presented with animations. Thus, it seems at least plausible that such subjects
have a masked capacity to revise the ‘fleeing’ state in response to counterev-
idence, a capacity which is obscured by their culturally entrained preference
to indulge fantasy over reality.
Cross-cultural research on animacy stimuli refutes the hypothesis that sub-
jects’ familiaritywith animatedmedia explains their tendency to experience the
smaller shapes as fleeing the triangle. Both Germans and hunter-horticulturist
Shuar subjects token ‘animacy’ interpretations in response to ‘animacy’ stim-
uli (Barrett et al. 2005). The fact that the ‘animacy’ interpretation arises for
subjects very seldom exposed to animated media suggests that the tendency
of subjects to represent the Heider and Simmel figures as animate is not the
product of culturally specific training. So, there is no reason to think that sub-
jects could suspend their representations of the figures as animate, were they
to choose to.
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A second reason to doubt that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable comes
from the suspicion that the ‘fleeing’ state might be destroyed by means of a
broadly Pavlovian process of conditioning. For instance, perhaps electrically
shocking subjects at appropriate times would destroy their tendency to repre-
sent the Heider and Simmel figures as animate.
If it should turn out that a process of conditioning could extinguish the
‘fleeing’ mental state, this result would not show that the ‘fleeing’ state is
revisable in the relevant sense. Recall that unrevisability is a kind of incapacity
to be rationally revised. Pavlovian interventions do not involve evidence; rather,
they forge positive or negative associations with relevant stimuli. Hence, such
interventions cannot bring about a rational revision.
I conclude that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is unrevisable. In the next section,
I argue that the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable can be used to show
that the ‘fleeing’ state is not a thought or a delusion.
V. IS THE ‘FLEEING’ MENTAL STATE A THOUGHT?
In Section III, I argued that the claim that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is a
System 1 thought is more attractive than other cognitive explanations. In this
section, I argue that the System 1 explanation ultimately fails because it cannot
accommodate the fact that the ‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable. I also argue that
the view that the ‘fleeing’ state is a delusion cannot explain the fact that the
‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable.
To be clear, I will argue that System 1 thoughts have a certain capacity
for rationality, not that System 1 thoughts are in fact rational. I will also
not claim that System 1 thoughts are typically or often rational. Thus, the
observation that System 1 thoughts sometimes conflict with other thoughts is
not a counterexample to my claim.
Furthermore, my claim is that already-tokened System 1 thoughts can be
revised. This claim is neutral on whether System 1 thoughts can be formed
on rational grounds. Since unrevisability concerns whether already-tokened
attitudes can be revised, it is irrelevant whether System 1 thoughts are capable
of being rationally formed.10
V.1. System 1 thoughts as revisable
The question of how and whether System 1 thoughts can be revised is a matter
of ongoing empirical inquiry. Nevertheless, a recent study provides us some
reason to think that System 1 thoughts are revisable. Subjects were presented
with a series of cognitive problems of the kind that tend to elicit System 1
10 Mandelbaum (2014) argues that thoughts are never rationally formed.
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responses. In some of these problems, the intuitive, System 1 response was
correct. In others, the intuitive, System 1 response was incorrect. Subjects who
provided an incorrect System 1 response reported a relatively weak feeling
of confidence in their response. Further, when given the opportunity to re-
evaluate their responses, subjects who reported this relatively weak feeling
of confidence spent a longer time producing a second response than other
subjects. These subjects were also more likely to change their answer than
other subjects. This longer response time suggests that in forming their second
response, these subjects switched to an analytic, System 2 mode of thinking
(Thompson and Johnson 2014).
This study suggests that the following mechanisms govern the revision of
System 1 thoughts: a mechanism which detects conflict between System 1
thoughts and other available evidence, a mechanism which triggers a weak
feeling of confidence in response to the detection of such a conflict, and a
mechanism which facilitates increased analytic engagement in response to a
weak feeling of confidence.
This cluster of mechanisms plausibly renders System 1 thoughts capable
of being rationally revised. For if System 1 thoughts lacked such a capacity, it
would be difficult to explain why this cluster of mechanisms should exist. If not
to respond to conflicts between System 1 thoughts and evidence derived from
other sources, it is hard to see why a mechanism for detecting such conflicts
should exist. If not to trigger re-evaluation of the evidence, it is hard to see
why the detection of such conflicts should trigger in subjects a weak feeling
of confidence. And if not to minimize such conflicts, it is hard to see why this
feeling should in turn prompt subjects to re-evaluate the evidence in a more
analytical mode of thought.11
We have some reason, then, to think that System 1 thoughts are capable of
being rationally revised.Moreover, there is no reason to think that this capacity
is selectively responsive to some sorts of counterevidence but not others. Thus,
it would appear that System 1 thoughts are revisable. Since the ‘fleeing’ state
is unrevisable, it is unlikely that the ‘fleeing’ state is a System 1 thought.12
V.2. Is the ‘fleeing’ state a delusion?
So far, I’ve argued that it is unlikely that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is a System
1 thought. This result leaves open the possibility that the ‘fleeing’ state is an
aberrant thought, such as a delusion. Since delusions are characteristically
11 Subjects’ changed responses were not always in the direction of increased accuracy, which
might be explained by the difficulty of the problems used (Thompson and Johnson 2014: 217).
12 There is some evidence that System 1 thoughts are not extinguished in response to coun-
terevidence but are rather moved to the level of the non-conscious in response to such evidence
(Svedholm-Ha¨kkinen 2015). If this view is correct, then the ‘fleeing’ state is unlikely to be a System
1 thought, since the ‘fleeing’ state remains conscious for most subjects.
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unrevisable, the delusion-based view of the ‘fleeing’ state is at least consistent
with the result that the ‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable (Byrne 2011: 120, 2012:
106–7). Nevertheless, I will argue that the delusion-based explanation cannot
explain why the ‘fleeing’ state is unrevisable. This is because the mechanisms
which underpin delusional persistence do not figure in the ‘fleeing’ state.
Recent results suggest that delusions are unresponsive to counterevidence
because their subjects have atypical evidence-gathering tendencies and—in
the case of persecutory delusions—atypically high levels of worry (Favrod et al.
2014; Freeman et al. 2015; Freeman and Garety 2014; Garety et al. 2014; Moritz
et al. 2013). However, the ‘fleeing’ state is reliably elicitable in most subjects,
including those who have typical evidence-gathering tendencies and typical
levels of worry. Thus, the mechanisms which explain delusional persistence
are simply absent in many subjects who token the ‘fleeing’ state. So, the view
that the ‘fleeing’ state is a delusion cannot explain why the ‘fleeing’ state is
unrevisable in these typical subjects.
In light of the failure of extant cognitive attitudes to account for the ‘fleeing’
mental state, one might propose that the ‘fleeing’ state is a novel cognitive
attitude. This state might be a sui generis attitude, such as a ‘seeming, ’ or it
might be a novel variant of one the familiar attitudes, such as a novel sort of
thought or delusion.
The suggestion that the ‘fleeing’ mental state is a sui generis attitude cannot
be altogether ruled out. Indeed, if there were no better explanation available,
we should endorse this hypothesis. However, as I will now show, there is a
better explanation, one which does not force us to enlarge our ontology of
mental attitudes. On this view, the ‘fleeing’ state is a visual illusion.13
VI. VISUALLY PERCEIVING THE INTENTIONS OF OTHERS
On the visual explanation, the ‘fleeing’ mental state is a visual experience.
More precisely, the ‘fleeing’ state is a visual illusion, since it misrepresents
inanimate entities as acting on intentions. Since the view that the ‘fleeing’ state
is a visual illusion posits that the state is an established mental kind, the view
is less ontically extravagant than the view that the ‘fleeing’ state is a novel kind
of attitude. At the same time, the view that the ‘fleeing’ state is a visual illusion
can explain the unrevisability of the ‘fleeing’ state, succeeding where cognitive
explanations failed.
Visual illusions are characteristically unresponsive to at least some kinds
of counterevidence. There are two major explanations of why this is so. On
the first account, at least some sorts of extravisual information never enter
13 The view that the ‘fleeing’ state is an associative, arational aliefwarrants more consideration
than I can give it here (Gendler 2008a,b). For concerns about positing aliefs, see Currie and Ichino
(2012), Doggett (2012), Nagel (2012), and Mandelbaum (2013).
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into the visual system as inputs, with the result that this information does not
impact visual experience. On this view, the visual system lacks access to such
information. (Fodor 1983, 1984, 2001: 63). On the second account, the visual
system cannot process at least some sorts of extra-visual information, with the
result that this information does not impact visual experience. On this view,
even if the visual system were to enjoy access such information, it would not be
able to interpret that information (Barrett 2006; Carruthers 2004, 2006, 2011).
For our purposes, it does not matter which of these explanations of visual
illusions is correct. Either explanation can account for the unrevisability of
the ‘fleeing’ mental state. On the first explanation, the reason the ‘fleeing’
state is unresponsive to conflicting evidence is that the ‘fleeing’ state is a
visual experience, and the visual system lacks access to at least some kinds
of extravisual evidence. On the second explanation, the reason the ‘fleeing’
state is unresponsive to conflicting evidence is that the ‘fleeing’ state is a visual
experience, and the visual system lacks the capacity to process at least some
kinds of extravisual evidence. Either way, by positing that the ‘fleeing’ state is
a visual experience, and more particularly a visual illusion, we can satisfyingly
explain its unrevisability by appealing to themechanisms which underlie visual
illusions more generally.14
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